Author Archives: Olivia

The Trouble with Freedom: Imagining America’s Future in Turbulent Times

Melissa Butcher, Professor of Social and Cultural Geography, shares insights into her latest research project ‘The Trouble with Freedom’, involving conversations with Americans across the USA on how they imagine America’s future.

In the last year I have listened to multiple speeches made by Donald Trump as part of his America First ‘Saving America’ tour of the United States, and the playbook has been much the same: a narrative of economic decline, humiliation on the international stage, record crime in Democrat run cities, the emasculation of ‘gender ideology’, and copious gasoline (at inflated prices) thrown on the bonfire of public education, followed by an overview of his achievements, and a call to supporters to keep the faith.

But Trump’s speech at the America First Policy Institute (AFPI, Washington DC, July 2022) was different. The narrative of decline and nostalgia for greatness was still there but most of the 90 minutes was dedicated to actual policy statements, with ‘Law and Order’ at its centre. Having spent the last year in conversation with a range of people from diverse backgrounds and political persuasions across America, I would have to concede that this is the best strategy America First Republicans could have devised. Violent crime, particularly in major cities, is rising[1], but more existentially, there is a general perception of disorder in America that ranges well beyond crime statistics. Even formerly ‘liberal’ strongholds like California are feeling the backlash.

A raft of pressure points on America’s cultural borders are causing them to buckle in ways that some argue is a necessary corrective, but others, particularly those identifying as ‘conservative’, are not comfortable with. As a global power in the 20th and early 21st centuries, America’s political, economic and social influence extended internationally, but the country now faces a series of challenges: competition from rising economic centres such as China; deindustrialisation and the shift to a digital economy; a democratic deficit with fractious governance; and polarised dissent in the face of ongoing racial injustices and shifting social norms, broadly dividing the country along generational, class, racial, rural/urban, and religious/secular lines.

These processes of internal and external change are generating questions about what it means to be American today, redefining American identity in a period of cultural flux, and highlighting a need for new forms of social cohesion as resurgent nationalism leads to exclusion and conflict. There are vanishing opportunities for contact that might generate the empathy and understanding necessary to narrow the gap between the extremes[2], and several authors, such as Stephen Marche[3], predict that it will end in tears, with another civil war on the horizon.

America’s political and social polarisation is exacerbated by divergence in core beliefs such as the American ‘master narrative’ of freedom. The historian Eric Foner has argued that freedom is a key organising principle underpinning America’s collective sense of identity. According to Foner, ‘No idea is more fundamental to American’s sense of themselves as individuals and as a nation than freedom’[4]. It is attached to a founding myth; enshrined in political discourse; and embedded within America’s global strategy, defending ‘the free world’ and promoting free markets internationally.

Yet there has always been more than one definition of this contested master narrative, and, therefore, of the United States. Freedom has been reshaped over time, with the boundaries between free and unfree moving beyond the absence of coercion to incorporate racialised, classed and gendered definitions, as well as aspiration, morality, law, religious, social, economic and political practices. As Tyler Stovall[5] outlines in his history of ‘White Freedom’ in America, some people have always had more freedom than others.

The contemporary battle for ownership of freedom is driven by the need to reconcile disorder that has emerged with recent ruptures in the American Dream. The idea of freedom embedded in consumer choice and the promise of an affluent future is disappearing in global financial crises and environmental collapse, the latter generally considered ‘nothing to worry about’ at America First rallies. Covid-19 mandates and vaccinations unleashed a Medical Freedom movement that has emphasised bodily autonomy despite risks to health (e.g. the right not to wear a mask, to not be vaccinated). That bodily autonomy does not now extend in many parts of America to the freedom to choose an abortion. Similarly, for some the freedom to own a semi-automatic rifle does not contradict support for the fall of Roe vs Wade in the name of preserving life. American culture leaps tall contradictions in a single bound.

The call to defend freedom features heavily in any America First rally, but what does freedom need defending from in 21st century America? Mostly, it seems, from an 18th century sounding ‘tyranny’, led by ‘leftists’/‘Marxists’/‘radical Democrats’/atheists/ a generic ‘evil’, and an unseen ‘globalism’ driven by the World Economic Forum and Big Tech elites amongst others. At the extreme end of conspiracy lies the imagining of a hidden global network readying itself to reset the economy in 2030 and enslave humankind. But this conspiracy is now part of mainstream political narrative in America. Trump’s AFPI speech announced his aim to not only ‘drain the swamp’ but to ‘root out the deep state’ by firing ‘rogue’, ‘incompetent’, ‘corrupt’, ‘unnecessary’ bureaucrats, who, in his view, blocked his political ambitions when in power. Trump references a ‘fifth column’ in his argument that ‘our biggest threat in this country remains the sick, sinister and evil people within’ … and then he name drops Nancy Pelosi. The global circulation of this populist rhetoric is evident in the UK as well: Boris Johnson referenced a ‘deep state’ conspiracy in one of his final speeches to the nation.[6]

What is unspoken at these rallies is the threat of demographic change that will see white Americans become a minority by 2050. This appears a more likely basis for the intense focus on defending ‘freedom’, particularly through the reinforcing of cultural borders in the teaching of history and the drawing of a hard line around gender. America First rallies, or any of the myriad of organisations that are part of a wider ‘National Conservatism’ movement (e.g. Turning Point USA, Moms for America, Look Ahead America, Advancing American Freedom, etcetera), rail against the miseducation of children who they believe are no longer taught a ‘proper’ version of American history and Judeo-Christian values on which they believe America is founded. Their vitriol goes as far as accusing teachers of ‘grooming’ children, and calling for the banning of books that reference race or sexuality in any way that might make parents feel uncomfortable.

While there is opposition on the ground to this politics, what is clear in conversations across the USA is that there is a sense of uncertainty in the future, not knowing if it will be a safe place physically, or existentially. There is ambiguity as power and culture shifts and people no longer know where the boundaries lie, getting things wrong in the process. There is a sense of powerlessness: no control over a pandemic, over China, over gas prices, no control over drought, and no stopping demographic mobility. There is no sense of control over the direction of change.

This discomfort is worked on by America First into a fever pitch of shame and humiliation, and years of research has taught me to never underestimate what people will do to avoid those feelings, including vote against what might be seen as their own interests. There can though be control over borders according to America First, in an America of ‘Law and Order’: a wall can be finished; ‘the homeless, drug addicts and dangerously deranged’, as described by Trump, will be removed to camps on parcels of land bought on the edges of cities; the death penalty will be introduced for drug trafficking; the unemployed will have to work; proof of citizenship will be needed to claim child tax credits; ‘illegal’ migrants will be sent back; the police will be given back ‘their authority, resources, power and prestige’, and Trump’s America will be ‘tough and nasty and mean if we have to’. Three times in his AFPI speech Trump explicitly called for more power to the President or Federal Government presumably led by him, in order to: have more ‘tools to combat unfair trade’; to override ‘weak mayors’ and ‘cowardly governors’; and to call in the National Guard to restore ‘order’ in cities he deems out of control.

Trump continues to shy away from making a formal declaration that he is running in 2024, perhaps waiting until after the mid-term elections in November, but it’s widely believed he will. Or if not him it will be his mirror image, possibly Ron deSantis, with less chaos and more focus. Whatever the timing, the Republicans under the guise of America First and national conservatism are sliding towards the removal of freedoms in freedom’s name.

Further information

References

[1] https://counciloncj.org/crime-trends-yearend-2021-update/

[2] https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2021/03/democrats-and-republicans-live-in-partisan-bubbles-study-finds/

[3] Marche, S. (2022). The Next Civil War: Despatches from the American Future. USA: Simon & Schuster.

[4] Foner, E. (1998). The Story of American Freedom. NY: Picador. p xiii

[5] Stovall, T. (2021). White Freedom: the Racial History of an Idea. USA: Princeton University Press.

[6] https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-11025507/Boris-Johnson-claims-Labour-deep-state-seek-reverse-Brexit-hes-gone.html

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Five ways museum work is classed (and what we might do about it)

Dr Samantha Evans was awarded her PhD, ‘Struggles for Distinction: class and classed inequality in UK museum work’, from Birkbeck’s Department of Organizational Psychology in November 2020. She won the Phillip Pullman Prize for Best Thesis in the School of Business, Economics and Informatics. She is currently a Research Fellow at UCL and will be moving to Royal Holloway as a Lecturer in Organisation Studies in October 2021. In this blog, Dr Evans highlights key findings from her PhD, in an update from her first blog, posted in April 2018.

Kelvingrove Museum, Glasgow

The recent appointment of George Osborne as Trustee of the British Museum generated a great deal of controversy within social media. Apart from being architect of policies which cut museum funding, his appointment exposes the realpolitik of power and money in a high-profile cultural institution. It also raises questions about work behind-the-scenes of the museum: who can get in and get on, and how might social class matter?

My doctoral research examined these questions, adapting Pierre Bourdieu’s theory and using secondary data, focus groups and interviews. This is a summary of my findings.

  1. Museum work is hierarchical and exclusive

Specialist curatorial knowledge, particularly in a national museum, has greater prestige than other roles. This may not seem surprising; this knowledge is seen to distinguish museums from other fields.  However, it does mean other forms of knowledge – audience-focussed, practical, technical, and commercial – play second fiddle and runs counter to attempts to position museums as inclusive. It is the exalted nature of these positions, that contributes to their being competitive and out of reach for many, requiring costly qualifications and working for low or no pay.

  1. Museum work is changing but is still exclusive

The status of curatorial work is however being challenged by the competitive funding environment. Museums need new sources of income, and such skills are increasingly being sought. This is not without controversy. The furore over the Tate’s recruitment of a Head of Coffee illustrates this. Such changes highlight that knowledge hierarchies are not fixed. However, at present, it is only the very top echelons (what Bourdieu would call a ‘field of power’) where the rules of the game are being changed, as can be seen in the appointment of museum directors from other sectors (from politics and online retail) and of course, George Osborne.

  1. Museum career paths are rigid AND insecure

For everyone else, there is a powerful discourse that museum careers are built on dedication to the field. This is reinforced by the specialised and geographical division of museum work which means there is limited opportunity to move, buoyed by a fear of being shut out should one leave the sector. Alongside this, museum work, like other sectors, is increasingly precarious, and individuals rather than institutions, are encouraged to take on the precarity of the market, by being flexible, enterprising and resilient. This puts pressure on everyone, but particularly for those with less capital, unable to demonstrate both dedication and afford their rent.

  1. There is limited attention on the museum worker

In an embattled sector, the focus has been on collections or audiences with less attention paid to the needs of museum workers. This is reflected in both policy and museum studies research. Where the workforce is considered, it is often as a vehicle for developing the sector, rather than a consideration of what we might call ‘good work.’ The lower status of management, viz-a-viz curatorial knowledge, make skills in people management less valued. And many small museums do not have the capacity to support, coach, or develop their staff.

  1. Museums are ‘classed’ too

Not all museums are equal. National museums have distinct privileges over and above other museums. They receive funding direct from central government, have a mandate to lead the sector, and an ability to capitalise on their status (attracting well-connected Trustees, high visitor numbers, TV deals).  Whilst some museums can sit at the same table, few can become a ‘national’. As such it creates a them and us divide, legitimised by nationals having the ‘best’ collections. These distinctions need critical scrutiny; collections often come from money, and their value is not neutral. From this lens, the appointment of George Osborne can be seen to reinforce such distinction, in effect upholding a classed system.

What can we do?

The pandemic offers an opportunity for museums to collectively rethink the skills they need, the way roles are designed, and how knowledge is valued. There is a need to develop inclusive career paths in and across sectors, creating partnerships, and to emphasise skills in “worker care” as much as “collections care”. National museums, funders, and universities have power and hence a responsibility to invest in this work.

There is more to this story. I am happy to give a talk, discuss solutions and hear your thoughts @samisatwork or Samantha.l.evans@ucl.ac.uk.

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Exploring global disparities in criminal sentencing

Catherine Heard directs the World Prison Research Programme, at Birkbeck’s Institute for Crime & Justice Policy Research. The research team monitors trends in world prison populations and examines the causes and the consequences of rising levels of imprisonment. The Institute’s latest comparative research on the sentencing of burglary, drug importation and murder highlights vast disparities between different jurisdictions in their approaches to custodial sentencing across a range of offences. Here, Catherine discusses some of the most striking disparities.

Imagine being convicted of a crime in another country, where the sentencing framework is very different to the one in your home country. For drug trafficking, you could be looking at life imprisonment and a hefty fine if you were sentenced in Thailand, but be home within months if you happened to be in the Netherlands.

Working with international research partners, we have examined how three hypothetical offence scenarios – below – would be dealt with in ten jurisdictions: Kenya, South Africa, Brazil, New York State, India, Thailand, England and Wales, Hungary, the Netherlands, and New South Wales, Australia. The work involved researching sentencing laws and policies, and interviewing 70 experienced defence lawyers about sentencing in practice.

Burglary

P-, a 32-year-old man, broke into a house when the residents were at work, accessing the rear of the house via a back alley and breaking a window to gain entry. He stole jewellery and cash belonging to one of the residents, worth a total of approximately [US$ 500]. He has several prior convictions for the same type of offence and other similar offences.

Drug importation

K-, a 26-year-old woman, was recruited in her home country of [Nigeria] to transport heroin in return for a cash payment. She had flown to [England] from her home country, carrying the heroin in a hidden compartment in a money belt. The quantity of heroin was 400 grams, or a little under 1 lb.

Intentional homicide

Two 23-year-old friends, L- and J-, got into an argument while drinking together in a bar. Both left the scene, and L- texted a mutual friend to say that he was going to kill J-. The next morning, on leaving his home for work, J- was confronted by L- who had been waiting for him outside his property. L- was armed with a knife, which he used to stab J- fatally in the chest.

Note: Minor adjustments were made to the value of items stolen, the country the drugs were imported from, and whether cocaine or heroin was imported, to ensure appropriateness for each country.

These contrasting scenarios allowed for clear comparisons between various elements of legal systems and sentencing frameworks, while also engaging important criminal justice and social policy issues.

Previous convictions a bar to non-custodial options

For the domestic burglar P-, non-custodial options would have been possible, even likely, in most of the ten countries, without the aggravating factor of his previous convictions. (His chances of avoiding prison would have been all the stronger if P- had pleaded guilty and made reparation.) But because of his prior offences, P- would probably get an immediate custodial sentence of several years, with three or four years likely in most countries. Only in the Netherlands would P- have a real prospect of avoiding prison, if his lawyer could convince the court that custody would serve no purpose and P- had better rehabilitation prospects in the community.

Disproportionately severe sentencing of drug offences

The most striking degree of disparity was found in the drug importation scenario. K- would be likely to receive a life sentence in Thailand, a 20 year term in India, 15 years in South Africa, and between five and 18 years in most of the other countries. Again, the Netherlands was the exception, with lawyers estimating her likely sentence at around four months.

In six jurisdictions, K- was also liable to receive a fine on top of custody: in New South Wales, the fine could equate to almost US$700,000 (but would be at the court’s discretion). In Brazil, a minimum fine equivalent to around US$3,500 would apply. In Kenya, South Africa, Thailand, and India, non-payment of the fine would probably mean extra time in custody. In Brazil it would mean removal from the electoral roll and losing the right to work.

Life sentences

In the case of L-, the perpetrator of homicide with intent, a life sentence would be the probable outcome in most of the ten countries. This would currently take effect as a whole life sentence (that is, with no possibility of release) in Kenya, potentially also South Africa, and as a minimum term of 20 to 25 years in England and Wales, New York State and New South Wales, with a right to apply for release on parole thereafter. In India and Thailand limited remission can be earned after a certain point. Also in Thailand, prisoners can earn eligibility for royal pardon and release as part of a system of intermittent amnesties.

The death penalty remains on the statute book as the sanction for murder in Kenya (where it was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2017), Thailand and India. In Thailand it is also mandated in drug trafficking cases but is generally commuted to life imprisonment if there is a confession. None of the defence lawyers considered a death sentence likely on the facts in L-’s case.

Brazil, alone among the ten countries, has no life sentence. For homicide, a mandatory minimum of 12 years applies: if judges sentence above this level (up to a statutory maximum of 30 years) they are expected to provide reasons. In Brazil, L- would probably receive a 14 year sentence, the first five or six years to be served in maximum security conditions.

In the Netherlands, life sentences  are almost never used. The most likely outcome for L- in a Dutch court would be a custodial term somewhere between three and twelve years, with a stay in a psychiatric treatment centre afterwards if the court was satisfied that he had a treatable condition. (Otherwise, the custodial term would likely be ten to twelve years, but without a potentially open-ended period in a psychiatric clinic.)

Do long prison sentences deter?

Politicians and governments tend to justify the use of life or very long custodial sentences largely on grounds of deterrence. The same reasoning has supported tougher sentences for repeat offenders, with fairly long custodial terms even when the index offence and the prior convictions did not involve violence. But the research evidence on the (general or specific/individual) deterrent effects of harsh sentences suggests that they are limited; the certainty of detection and punishment are more effective deterrents. Deterrence theory also fails to account for impulsivity, unmet mental health needs, the influence of drugs and alcohol, or the role of poverty and weak social support – all factors known to underlie much offending.

What is beyond doubt is that the introduction of tougher, more arbitrary sentencing regimes greatly increased prison populations, while doing nothing to resolve the underlying and complex drivers of much (re-)offending.

Further information

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