The Centre for Innovation Management Research (CIMR) is one of Birkbeck’s inter-disciplinary research centres. Professor Helen Lawton-Smith, Director of CIMR, explains what it’s all about.
CIMR is an inclusive and impactful centre of research excellence in the field of innovation and entrepreneurship. Inclusivity comes from the engagement in all our activities of CIMR members, our academic colleagues in Birkbeck and in other universities, our diverse set of visiting fellows and alumni (professionals in a wide range of organisations) and our PhD students.
Impact comes from our research, publication and dissemination in societally important topics. Recent studies include analysis of strategies for knowledge exchange, of knowledge co-creation, of diversities of innovation (BAME and disabled groups), public policy on entrepreneurship and innovation in differing regional, national and international contexts and on. We’ve been awarded research grants by the ESRC, British Academy, European Commission and Innovate UK.
We engage in national and international collaborations. In 2019, led by CIMR, the School of Business Economics and Informatics signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Kogod School of Business, American University, Washington DC. CIMR colleagues work closely with scholars in the US and in mainland European countries including Sweden and Italy.
We publish in top international journals including Research Policy, Industry and Innovation, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, European Urban and Regional Studies, Entrepreneurship & Regional Development, Small Business Economics, and Regional Studies.
Our research insights feed directly into UK and international policy-making. We have informed practice in the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, Innovate UK, European Commission and the OECD.
Our research and international collaborations feed directly into teaching on technology transfer, innovation and entrepreneurship and blockchain. Masters students are welcomed to CIMR events and to join our alumni – we look forward to meeting you.
Dr Sue Konzelmann from the Department of Management assesses the potential impact deeper cuts would have had on the UK in the wake of the Recession.
David Cameron’s recent description of the government’s management of the Brexit process could equally well have been applied to his government’s programme of austerity, which started in 2010 – and for most of us, is still rumbling on.
After almost a decade of austerity, during which growth has sputtered, poverty has risen and reliance on food banks has ballooned, the fiscal deficit is now almost gone. Something to celebrate? Well, it might have been, had public debt not continued to increase significantly. This is because the only way to reduce public debt is to run a significant and sustained fiscal surplus. And there is still no sign of that.
But Cameron has form when it comes to confusing a fiscal deficit with national debt. Back in 2013, Andrew Dilnot, then head of the UK Statistics Authority, found it necessary to publicly rebuke him for claiming that his government was “paying down Britain’s debts”. At the time of course, national debt was still rising strongly.
Nonetheless, Cameron now claims that things might have gone better, had he implemented his austerity plan “faster and harder”, during the “window of permission” following the 2010 election. Is he right?
“Cameron’s programme of austerity was misguided in the first place.”
In my new book, Austerity, the case study of the UK following the 2008 financial crisis strongly suggests otherwise. The period following that crisis is now often referred to as the “Great Recession” – the definition of recession being two or more successive quarters of zero or negative GDP growth. We all know that recessions usually result in higher unemployment-related social costs, as well as reduced government tax receipts. This double whammy means that an increased fiscal deficit – and therefore public debt – is pretty much inevitable during a recession. Especially if you’ve also just spent billions bailing out the banks.
Cameron’s programme of austerity was therefore misguided in the first place. Since it only targeted government spending, it simply reduced the size of the economy further. The idea that a contraction in public spending could be more than replaced by private investment and enterprise – so-called “expansionary fiscal contraction” – is at best highly controversial. In our new book, Rethinking Britain: Policy Ideas for the Many, we describe is as “the economic equivalent of Big Foot; some economists claim to have seen it, but none have been able to prove that it actually exists”. A forlorn hope then.
Cameron’s austerity was implemented when the economy was slowly beginning to grow; but the recovery was not yet strong enough to withstand its dampening effects. Policy should instead have focused on encouraging growth, which would, in turn, have reduced social costs and increased tax revenues – both of which help to reduce the fiscal deficit and – if a sustained surplus is created – public debt as well. But with a fragile economy, like the UK’s in 2010, austerity inhibited growth, with predictable results; and growth has never been stellar since. But even so, make no mistake: It isn’t austerity that reduced the deficit; it’s what little growth we’ve had. Imagine where we could have been by now had policy priorities in 2010 focused on encouraging growth, rather than killing it off.
“In economic terms, the results of “harder and faster” austerity would probably have been even more unhelpful than what actually happened.”
And what are the likely effects of “harder and faster” austerity? Deeper and more abrupt cuts in government spending would have shrunk the economy more drastically and immediately – producing a deeper recession in the process. This, in turn, would have increased social costs and reduced tax receipts “harder and faster” as well. The knock-on effect would have been a sharp rise in both the government’s deficit and debt. And it is very hard to see where the growth to lift the economy out of such a deep recession would have come from, without some kind of stimulus. In other words, in economic terms, the result of “harder and faster” austerity would probably have been even more unhelpful than what actually happened.
In social terms, the probable effect of deeper and more immediate cuts is harder to assess. Cameron’s austerity programme has – in spite of claims to the contrary – resulted in growing poverty and inequality, increased homelessness, worsening crime and reduced public services. And this has contributed to a sharp increase in the number of people who have had enough of austerity. Since many of these people were looking for some means of getting back at Cameron’s government, offering them the vote on EU membership in the middle of his austerity programme, was clearly a high-risk strategy as well. All of this has resulted in a radically changed political configuration in Britain.
It’s hard to see what’s so great about eliminating the fiscal deficit, if in the process public debt has vastly increased and social outcomes for most have sharply deteriorated. Not only has austerity not worked, it’s done immense damage to Britain. We’ve had nearly ten years of austerity, and over three years of Brexit wrangling, with apparently no end in sight for either. Surely, developing policies to fix the all too obvious problems in our economy and society, would be far more productive that crowing about a reduced deficit?
The only crumb of comfort in all this is that given Cameron’s recent comments about wishing he’d imposed austerity “harder and faster” in 2010, things might have turned out much worse.
Sue Konzelmann, Reader in Management at Birkbeck, and her colleagues John Weeks and Marc Fovargue-Davies introduce their new book, Rethinking Britain: Policy Ideas for the Many.
Of the nineteen UK governments since the Second World War, only two have torn up the rule book and tried to build a better future, instead of simply recycling the tired slogans and policies of the past. The two governments that did try radical change – not always successfully – were those of Clement Attlee in 1945 and Margaret Thatcher in 1979. We are therefore well overdue for another major policy rethink, aimed at solving the problems we have now – largely as a consequence of Thatcher’s legacy – rather than endlessly trying to reignite the ideological battles of the past. That’s why we concluded it was high time for Rethinking Britain: Policy Ideas for the Many.
Rethinking Britain is not only for the many – it’s also written by the many. As a result, it doesn’t set out the vision of one or two people, but instead offers the assessment of a wide range of experts, who are working in or studying the areas we cover. We not only set out the problems and suggest policy solutions to address them. Our aim is to help improve life for people living in today’s Britain.
Between each set of policy ideas, you’ll also find interludes. These draw upon real-life stories of people in Britain who are experiencing unresolved difficulties that should be considered unacceptable in any developed economy or civilised society – and we suggest how these problems could be solved, too.
“We strongly believe that a society that produces healthy, well educated, strongly motivated people – who have, or can realistically hope for, a good standard of living – will also help to generate a powerful and dynamic economy.”
Although some depressing situations are described, our overall approach is extremely positive. Instead of denying that there are problems – or ignoring them, as many politicians have done – we take a much more “can do” approach to building the society that most of us would want to live in. That leads to another significant point: Whilst Attlee’s 1945 government put people and society at the centre of its policy ideas, less than forty years later, Thatcher’s administration reversed this, focusing on the individual, privatization and the wealthy. This raises the question: “In whose interests should the economy be run”?
The shift to individualism, private profit maximization and an obsession with “free” markets resulted in serious wealth for the few – and runaway inequality and poverty for the many. It’s therefore not hard to guess where those contributing to Rethinking Britain are coming from! We strongly believe that a society that produces healthy, well educated, strongly motivated people – who have, or can realistically hope for, a good standard of living – will also help to generate a powerful and dynamic economy.
The post-1979 dogma – that the British government should play as small a part in the economy as possible – is also misguided. Far too much capital is being used for short-term, speculative purposes, whilst not enough is finding its way into the development of sustainable businesses that provide long term employment and pay decent wages – not the hand to mouth existence of a zero hours contract. In other words, the economy should work for the many, not just the few.
Another theme that runs through Rethinking Britain is the concept of citizenship – where sets of rights and obligations mean that you are indeed part of something bigger than yourself. This is the polar opposite of Thatcher’s point of view, that there is “no such thing as society”. Many of her policy ideas were developed in the context of the Cold War – which came to an end thirty years ago; and it’s time for her policy ideas to do the same.
By investing in Britain’s people, we can build a stronger, more cohesive society – which will underpin a more vibrant economy. Rethinking Britain shows how.
Dr Federica Rossi, lecturer in business economics discusses increasing expectations on universities to demonstrate the positive economic and social impacts of their activities, and her research into measuring the efficiency of their efforts.
Knowledge transfer is a term used to encompass a broad range of activities to support mutually beneficial collaborations between universities, businesses and the public sector. In the face of demands from funding bodies and ultimately taxpayers, universities all over the world are increasingly expected to demonstrate that their activities have a positive economic and social impact. Direct knowledge transfer to businesses, governments and society in general allows universities to make a visible contribution outside the ‘ivory tower’ of academia and can also help them to raise additional funds.
Measuring efficiency
Since knowledge transfer has become as important as a university’s longstanding commitment to teaching and research, the question of how well they perform this mission has gained prominence. Most universities attempt to measure performance in knowledge transfer, but focus on a quantity of outputs rather than the quality or efficiency. Even studies that measure efficiency tend to focus on a limited set of knowledge transfer activities, like technology through the commercialisation of patent licenses, creation of spin-out companies or research contracting with industry.
However, universities fulfil their knowledge transfer mission through many other activities, which include delivering knowledge-intensive services such as consultancies, clinical tests, prototypes and professional development courses, engaging in informal networks and staff exchanges with industry, contributing to community regeneration programmes and engaging with the public through different media.
Findings
The efficiency of 97 universities in the United Kingdom was measured for a range of knowledge transfer activities: research contracts, consultancies, professional development courses, generation of intellectual property and public engagement. Compared with a restrictive definition of knowledge transfer that only includes research contracts and intellectual property, this broader approach produces a different ranking for the most efficient universities: more universities achieve efficiency, and the distribution of efficiency scores is less skewed.
The universities that increase their efficiency when a broader definition of knowledge transfer is used have a lower share of staff in medicine and natural sciences and a higher share of staff in the arts and humanities; they are less likely to have a university hospital, and are more teaching-intensive. By adopting a broader approach to measuring knowledge transfer, some universities that are less research-oriented and less focused on science and medicine can better demonstrate their efficiency. More efficient institutions have a larger amount of staff and students; they are older, but have a more recently established knowledge transfer office; and they are specialised in a few subject areas (although some diversified universities are also efficient). Research, teaching intensity, and geographical location do not have a significant effect on efficiency.
Implications
The findings suggest that universities with different production models can be equally efficient in generating knowledge transfer outputs, and that research intensity is not a prerequisite for efficiency. Universities can achieve efficiency by adopting a model of knowledge transfer engagement that is consistent with their resources, without needing to replicate the knowledge transfer strategies of prominent institutions whose resources may be very different. By improving their reputation for excellence in specific activities that best fit the institution’s resources, universities may increase their ability to generate further knowledge transfer outputs. In fact, institutional reputation appears to increase knowledge transfer opportunities, with more reputable older, larger and diversified institutions achieving greater efficiency.
Another implication of the findings is that, rather than having an established Knowledge Transfer Office (KTO), what affects efficiency are its practices and policies, and the professionalism of its staff. KTOs therefore need to invest in staff training and in the development of best practices. Developing specialised, subject-specific skills and structures to support knowledge transfer, rather than generic ones may also pay off.
While performance is often measured by looking at outputs, thinking about performance in terms of efficiency helps us recognise that universities work with very different resources, which affects the nature of their knowledge transfer engagement. Changes in the resources available to universities, through potential changes in the rules governing the allocation of public funds, will also change their ability to engage in knowledge transfer.
Policymakers need to think systematically about the effect of changes in funding for research and teaching (for example, the replacement of recurrent grants with competitive funding) on a university’s ability to engage in knowledge transfer. The relationship between funding sources and knowledge transfer strategies, which has been largely unexplored to date, would merit greater attention from both researchers and policymakers.
The detailed empirical analysis on which these results build is presented in:
Rossi, F. (2017) The drivers of efficient knowledge transfer performance: evidence from British universities, Cambridge Journal of Economics.
